The Bombing War: Europe, 1939-1945 Paperback – International Edition, 5 Jun. 2014

Richard Overy’s new book has had positive reviews from much more prestigious readers than I and it is not difficult to see why. I think this book is probably the definitive study of the Strategic Bombing Campaigns carried out against targets in Europe during the 2nd World War. The exclusion of the equivalent campaigns in the Pacific and Chinese theatre’s is a shame but is understandable given the wealth of material required just for the European theatre.Overy charts the development in the 1930s of Strategic bombing theory by European powers and the consequent development of the air forces of Britain and Germany in particular. What is apparent is that the civilian populations of Europe from the outset of the war expected themselves to be targets of aerial attack (the 1st world war had already been understood as a ‘total war’) and some Civil Defence measures had already been taken, especially in Germany. In some quarters it was thought that, as British PM Baldwin stated as early as 1932, the “bomber always get through” and it was believed that such devastation would quickly be caused that populations and economies of the attacked would be incapable of withstanding the assault. As Overy points out this was not the case – especially early in the war - as the attacking air forces were simply incapable of delivering heavy attacks with any accuracy against defended targets although the Spanish Civil War example of Guernica certainly stoked the pre-war assumptions. Even later in the war when allied bombers with the range and payload to do serious damage had become available in numbers, only the most blinkered exponents of Air Power (and one of these must certainly have been Bomber Command’s chief – Arthur Harris) still believed bombers could deliver a “knockout blow”. The bombing campaign in Europe and especially that of the RAF had become a ‘Western Front in the air’ a war of attrition with no clear-cut end. One frightening statistic worth noting is that only 50% of Bomber Command aircrew survived the war whereas 90% of 1st world war Tommies survived the war on the Western Front.A key strength of this book is its view of each of the aerial campaigns against civilian and economic targets – the Battle of Britain; the RAF and USAAF offensives against Germany and Italy, the Russian (desultory) attacks on Germany and Germany’s attack on Russian strategic targets (also desultory – in the event many more Russian civilians were killed by artillery and bullets than by air dropped bombs). The most important campaigns were those of Germany against Britain and of the RAF/USAAF against Germany but each campaign is given space and both attackers and defenders capabilities are covered including civil defence measures. In the east the air war was mostly tactical in support of the huge armies constantly in action. In the west for the most part of the war air power alone was employed ostensibly against military targets by the USAAF (though Eighth Air Force post-raid assessment showed that the vast majority of bombs dropped came fell more than 2,000 feet from the target) and against cities by the RAF - justified because it would shorten the war and save the lives of Allied soldiers, and destroy the ability and will of German industrial workers to produce the material of war - an assertion that Overy shows to be difficult to reconcile with the five long years of British bombing.Overy demonstrates, convincingly in my view, that the resources given to the Allied air forces to pursue their campaigns were for the most part wasted and could have been better employed in other ways but given the unwillingness of the British in particular to start a ground campaign in the West before 1944 were understandable at the time. The 40% of the armed forces’ direct military budget that was consumed by the proponents of air power during the war, together with the diversion of skilled technical and scientific manpower that went with it, looks like poor value for money now.The trouble was that most of the claims made for air power’s effectiveness were never delivered. Whilst the Allied campaigns against Germany did have significant effects for example the:‘substantial diversion of guns and aircraft away from the fighting fronts where they were needed more than ever by the summer of 1943. By late August there were over 1,000 fighter aircraft stationed in Germany, 45.5 per cent of all German fighter strength, and a further 224 in northern France. Over the same period the number of heavy anti-aircraft guns on the home front increased from 4,800 before Gomorrah to over 6,000 by the end of August, including more of the heavier 10.5-cm and 12.8-cm’It was however, only when the USAAF was able to force the Luftwaffe on to the defensive and provide long range escort fighters were decisive contributions made. The destruction of the Luftwaffe was essential as a prelude to the Allied Invasion and this was achieved almost entirely by the USAAF. In one week during February 1944 the Luftwaffe lost one-third of its single-engine fighters and almost one-fifth of its fighter crew. By contrast, the number of P-51 ‘Mustang’ fighters available was 90 per cent higher at the end of ‘Big Week’ than it had been at the beginning. As a consequence the hours devoted to training for a new German fighter pilot fell from 210 in 1942 to 112 by 1944; operational training was reduced from 50 hours to 20.Hungarian émigré economist, Nicholas Kaldor, a member of the USSBS team, argued that the critical factors in choosing economic targets were the degree of ‘cushion’, the degree of ‘depth’ and the degree of ‘vulnerability’. - for most of the war period Germany had a large cushion of resources of capital stock, labour and raw materials that could be allocated to sustaining war production - Only in 1944, with the American decision to focus on enemy air power, oil and transport were three targets chosen which fortuitously matched Kaldor’s calculation that the economic effects of allied Strategic bombing were realised.In this review I have concentrated on the bombing strategy of the Western powers only because these were by far the most damaging and prolonged attacks of the war. This book does however cover every combatant in the European theatre – including lesser powers such as Bulgaria and Romania and it provides excellent perspective across the theatre. It must be noted that none of the combatants were squeamish about killing civilians and as the war went on they all became less concerned about such moral niceties. In the end, Overy’s verdict is damning. He argues convincingly that “strategic bombing proved in the end to be inadequate in its own terms for carrying out its principle assignments and was morally compromised by deliberate escalation against civilian populations.” This is a book that has challenged my own pre-conceptions. A must read for anyone with an interest in the subject.

Richard Overy answers two key questions: what were the strategic effects of bombing, and was it moral?Overy says answers to these questions have generated much heat but have relied on a shallow base of evidence. He gives the first full account of the bombing war in Europe 1939 to 1945 (not just in the UK and Germany). His research is impeccable and he is able, as a result of detailed evidence, to come up with a fresh picture.Bombing in Europe, he says, was never a war-winning strategy and the other services knew it. British Bomber Command wanted to prove its worth as an independent force, but lacking the technology for accurate bombing fell to area-bombing of cities in the belief that given sufficient damage to structures and people Germany would surrender without the need for an army invasion. This aim failed.Overy also explores how the concept of 'total war' gradually gave acceptance to the deliberate large-scale killing of civilians who were now seen as in the 'front line'.As a young child I can recall sitting in an Anderson shelter at night hearing the drone of bombers overhead which (it turned out) were on their way to bomb Coventry. We saw the sky lit up with fires. Later, I can recall how the BBC radio news reported the launching of RAF '1000-bomber' raids, with a degree of satisfaction it seemed to me. My young friend's brother was killed - he was a rear gunner in a Lancaster.This book has allowed me to see the bombing war in a balanced light. Bombing aside, if you have any interest in the Second World War you must read this.

Richard Overy is a respected academic historian in the field of air history. This large book is best described as a comprehensive overview and consolidation of many monographs and journal articles, diaries, contemporary views and official records concerning bombing in Europe in the Second World War.Overy has not produced either an encyclopedia or a dictionary and this well-written work introduces the reader to strategic bombing theory, practice, its consequences and aftermath at political, moral, technological and socio-economic levels. The British and US bombing of Germany looms large as one would expect but the German bombing of the Soviet Union, the Allied bombing of Italy and other Axis nations and friendly countries such as France are also discussed.Overy ranges across the subject and succeeds in making this a story of people as well as a study of the theoretical and organisational development of the respective air forces. At times I thought I was reading a work by Juliet Gardiner (a historian of the home front). This is not a criticism though the extent to which Overy goes into the measures taken by the civilian authorities and their citizens was not what I expected.I didn't feel I had read new arguments to explain the reasons for strategic bombing in the Second World War in Europe though I learned much. However, this a consolidation of current learning by an expert in his subject. This book, though long, is a good introduction, combining a chronological and thematic approach which makes it easier to identify areas of particular interest. Those who wish to pursue individual topics in greater depth will find an excellent bibliography with which to continue their reading.